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PROBLEMS AND NEW DEVELOPMENTS
IN CONTEMPT
The following remarks are part of a panel discussion
on Problems and New Developments in Contempt given at
the Annual Meeting of the National Conference of State Trial
Judges in Montreal, Canada, August 6, 1966. Specific areas
covered by the panel were "Problems in Contempt," "Civil
and Criminal Contempt," and "Contempt by Publication: The
Press." The panelists were the Honorable Eugene A. Burdick
of Williston, North Dakota, the Honorable William W Keller
of Laconia, New Hampshire, and Arthur E. Sutherland, Bussey Professor of Law, HarvardLaw School.

PROBLEMS IN CONTEMPT
EUGENE

A. BURDICK

*

The judicial power, one of the three coordinate branches of
government, is usually conferred by constitutional provisions or
pursuant to constitutional power granted to the legislative branch
to create judicial trribunals. Many of the powers which the court
must exercise in keeping its house m order are necessarily implied.
These include the rule-making power, the power to regulate the conduct of counsel as officers of the court, the power to regulate all
phases of the trial of cases, the power to enforce obedience to its
process, the power to compel the attendance of witnesses, the power
to enforce its judgments, and the power to afford protection to
litigants, witnesses and counsel in maintaining decorum and a proper
respect for its own dignity These powers are inherent to an orderly
exercise of judicial authority
Perhaps the most important of the inherent powers of a court
is the power to punish for contempt. Broadly speaking, the contempt power is exercised with great restraint and is infrequently
invoked. This is as it should be. When a contempt situation does
arise, there is usually an element of urgency about it that leaves
the judge little opportunity for research or reflection. For these
reasons, the judge should become thoroughly familiar with the basic
0
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concepts of contempt so that he may deal with a contempt problem
promptly, effectively and correctly when it arises.
In considering any problem m contempt, it is important to keep
m mind several fundamental distinctions. Contempt committed m
the immediate view or presence of the court is a direct contempt.
A direct contempt requires no separate hearing or special pleading.'
Generally, a simple order stating with particularity the facts which
constitute an actual contempt, without the aid of speculation, will
suffice whether a fine or imprisonment is imposed. 2 The power
to punish summarily for direct contempt does not seem to be open
to question. 3 In an older case,' the Supreme Court held that a
contempt order for a direct contempt can be issued absentia.
Contempt committed out of the view or immediate presence of
the court is indirect or constructive contempt. Examples of such
contempt may be found in the news publication problems (which
will be discussed by Professor Sutherland) and in the widespread
failure to comply with an order for support in matrimonial cases.
Contempts of this character require a hearing m order that the
court may become fully informed of the facts comprising the contempt of court.
Another important criteria for a direct contempt is that the
court must be functioning as an open court whose proceedings can
be publicly observed. In re Oliver,5 held that perjury, even if
committed before a judge sitting as a grand jury m secret session,
would be an indirect criminal contempt requiring a public hearing.
While the power to punish contempt is inherent, legislation regulating the exercise of the contempt power is almost universal.6
With respect to indirect contempt, m particular, legislation has the
virtue of providing uniformity of procedure and reasonable limits
on the disposition the court may make. The courts, it seems, have
accepted this legislative encroachment on the judicial power.7
Contempt, whether direct or indirect, may be criminal or civil.
If the sole purpose of punishment is to coerce the contemner into
compliance with an order of the court and compliance would benefit the adverse party, then such contempt is civil. On the other
hand, if the purpose of punishment is retribution to the contemner
for conduct disrespectful or insulting to judicial authority or which
1. State v. Root, 5 N.D. 487, 67 N.W 590 (1896).
2. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-10-46 (1960), Chula v. Superior Court, 57 Cal.2d 199, 368
P.2d 107 (1962) , State v. Crum, 7 N.D. 299, 74 N.W 992 (1898).
3. Fisher v. Pace, 336 U.S. 155 (1949).
4. Ex Parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289 (1888).
5. 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
6. N.D. CENT. CODE Ch. 27-10 (1960).
7. Bridges v. Superior Court, 14 Cal.2d 464, 94 P.2d 983 (1939) , Keller v. Keller,
323 P.2d 231 (Wash. 1958).
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obstructs the court in the performance of judicial functions, the
contempt is criminal. If punishment serves both purposes, the contempt is both civil and criminal.
We shall now consider a few specific problems to illustrate
these fundamentals.
How does the court deal with a witness who conveniently
"forgets"?
In Second Addittonal Grand Jury v Cirillo, s Cirillo, while testifying before a grand jury, had been granted immunity and being
required to answer questions regarding his actions on a certain date,
simply answered that "I don't remember." It was clear from the
evidence that Cirillo had a detailed recollection of many events on
the day in question and that his answer to certain vital questions
"I don't remember" was a mere sham and constituted a refusal to
testify. This was held to be a criminal contempt. To constitute
contempt, however, the state of the evidence must be such that the
witness can recall the events about which he is interrogated, but
merely declines to answer.
The Cirillo case presents a further interesting question as to
whether a series of refusals to answer constitute a series of contempts or a single contempt. Cirillo was asked to testify before
the grand jury at an earlier session on November 1, 1961. He refused to answer and was held in criminal contempt and served a
30-day sentence. At the second session of the grand jury, held on
December 5, he was asked the same questions and, in like manner,
he refused to testify The contempt order for the second refusal
was sustained, apparently because of the substantial lapse of time
between the two hearings.
If the lapse of time between the two interrogations is unreasonably short, the refusal to testify will be considered as a single
subject of inquiry, justifying only one contempt order 9 In Gautreaux
v Gautreaux,10 the contemner was found guilty of a direct criminal
contempt by reason of an outburst in court and was summarily
ordered to be confined. After the order was issued and before he
could be removed from the courtroom his outburst was repeated.
This was held to be but a single contempt.
The test of reasonableness for determining whether contemptuous acts constitute separate and distinct contempts is not whether
there has been a previous adjudication for contempt, but whether
the subsequent contemptuous act is so interwoven with the previous
8.
9.
10.

12 N.Y.2d 206, 188 N.E.2d 138 (1963).
Yates v. United States, 355 U.S. 66 (1957).
220 L.a 564, 57 So.2d 188 (1952).

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REvIEw

conduct that it is inseparable therefrom.1 1
Courts often have difficulty in determining whether contemptuous conduct was comitted within the immediate view or presence
of the court. Suppose the court calls a pre-trial conference and
plaintiff's counsel fails to appear
Is this a direct contempt of
the court? In Link v Wabash Railroad Company,' 2 the Court upheld an order dismissing the plaintiff's action with prejudice where
plaintiff's counsel had failed to appear at the pre-trial conference.
Justice Black wrote a vigorous dissent which is worthy of your
consideration.
In Chula v Superor Court,3 defendant's counsel failed to appear for sentencing of the defendant. Defendant's counsel had sent
an associate to represent him. The associate counsel was tardy.
Defendant's counsel had a history of other unexcused failures to
appear in this case and in other cases. The court, following procedure for an indirect contempt, held counsel to be m direct
criminal contempt of court. A strong dissent by Justice Traynor
points out that the finding of a direct contempt is questionable in
view of the fact that the court could not possibly have been aware
of excusable conduct if any existed, without a hearing. The majority placed the burden upon the attorney to establish his inability
to be present. This case seems to reverse the usual presumption
of innocence. While this writer agrees with the result, it seems
questionable that the conduct of counsel constituted a direct criminal
contempt of the court.
When does perjury constitute a direct contempt? State v
Estill, 4 held that because it was necessary for the trial court to
receive evidence in order to establish the falsity of the testimony,
it did not judicially know that the accused's testimony was false.
Therefore, it was not a direct contempt. In re Oliver,'5 would support
this view.
In another case involving the failure of counsel to file a defense
memorandum, as required by a local rule of the court, the court
struck the names of defense witnesses and fined counsel $100.00
and costs. This order was reversed on appeal as constituting a
penalty not authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."6
In Green v United States,'7 the defendant failed to surrender for
the purpose of serving his sentence pursuant to a custody order
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

See 94 A.L.R.2d 1246.
371 U.S. 873 (1962).
57 Cal.2d 199, 368 P.2d 107 (1962).
349 P.2d 210 (Wash. 1960).
Supra note 5.
Gamble v. Pope and Talbott, Inc., 307 F.2d 729 (3rd Mr. 1962).
356 U.S. 165 (1958).
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abiding the outcome of an appeal. The majority of the Supreme
Court speaking by Justice Harlan, held that this failure to surrender
constituted a direct criminal contempt, punishable summarily
There were four dissenting Justices. In a plethora of precedent,
the majority also held that the contemner was not entitled to trial
by jury
Two significant companion cases were recently decided by the
United States Supreme Court. In Shillatant v United States, 8 the
Court held that the contemner was not entitled to trial by jury for
a civil contempt. The contemner had been sentenced to serve a
term of two years for refusal to answer questions after being
granted immunity under the Narcotics Control Act of 1956. It may
be noted, following In re Oliver, 9 that this was an indirect contempt. The grand jury before whom he refused to testify was dissolved while his sentence had been partially served. The Court held
that the sentence, although termed criminal, was clearly civil as its
purpose was to coerce the contemner into testifying, rather than
to punish and that the contemner had the power of escaping punishment at any time he wished by testifying. The grand jury having
been dissolved, however, the purpose of the punishment could no
longer be served and he was released.
Contrastingly, in Cheff v Schnackenberg,20 the Supreme Court
held that six-months imprisonment for an indirect criminal contempt
for violation of a cease and desist order did not require trial by
jury to satisfy due process of law under the Fifth Amendment. In
this respect, the court followed Green v United States," and
United States v Barnett,2 with a noteworthy exception. Without
any precedent whatever to sustain his position, Justice Clark,
speaking for the majority and joining the dissenters in United States
v Barnett, pronounced a dictum that henceforth any sentence for
a criminal contempt in the federal courts (and it may be presumed
that the Court was referring to an indirect form of criminal contempt) which carries the punishment of imprisonment for more than
six months will violate the due process clause of the Constitution
unless a jury trial has been received or waived. It would seem
to be inevitable that the Court will apply the same rule to the
States under the due process clause of the 14th Amendment.
What should a judge do who is personally involved in the matter
of the contempt? A borderline case on the subject is Fisher v
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

384 U.S. 364 (1966).
333 U.S. 257 (1948).
384 U.S. 373 (1966).
Eupra note 17.
376 U.S. 681 (1964).
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Pace.23 In that case, counsel persisted in an effort to present to
the jury, contrary to the rules of the court, the suggestion that so
many weeks of disability in a Workmen's Compensation Case would
result in the loss of X dollars. After admonishing counsel, the
court said, "I'll declare a mistrial if you mess with me two minutes
and a half, and fine you besides." Counsel responded, "That is all
right, we take exception to the conduct of the court." The court
replied, "That is all right, I'll fine you $25.00." The colloquy grew
in intensity from there and ultimately a fine of $100.00 and three
days in jail were imposed. This contempt order was upheld on appeal. There were three vigorous dissents by Justices Douglas
(Black concurring), Murphy and Rutledge. This case can be contrasted with Offutt v United States,2 4 wherein the Court held that
a judge who becomes embroiled with counsel in a continuous
wrangle should call m another judge to sit on the contempt hearing.
A similar result was reached in United States v Bradt,25 where
the attorney had filed an affidavit of prejudice against the judge,
setting forth some rather strong references to improprieties by the
judge. After the judge rejected the affidavit or prejudice, counsel
withdrew from the presence of the court. The judge held him to
be in direct contempt. On appeal, the order was reversed.
In a news item appearing in the Associated Press, dateline
Sioux City Iowa, on May 18, 1966, a juvenile court judge observed
a disturbance outside his house at midnight, involving four unruly
boys who were grabbing and teasing a young girl. He told the
boys to go home and informed them that he was a judge and that
he was giving an order of the court. The boys attacked him, saying, "To hell with judges and the courts," and administered a beating to the judge. About two weeks later, after holding hearings, he
found the boys in contempt of court and handed out six months
county jail sentences and fines to the offenders. Without in any way
justifying the reprehensible conduct of the boys, it would seem that
this is another case where the judge should have called in another
judge to hear the contempt matter, if it was indeed contempt of
court. That it was contempt, is highly questionable, m view of the
fact that the court was nowhere near its court facilities, was not
sitting as a court, and certainly no jurisdiction had been acquired
in any way over the youths involved. In re Oliver, 6 would seem to
apply.
28.
24.
25.

836 U.S. 185 (1949).
348 U.S. 11 (1954).
294 P.2d 879 (6th Cir. 1961).

26.

Supra note 5.
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Suppose the court's jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
suit is challenged and the court issues an injunctional order upon
the plausible, but erroneous, conclusion that it had such jurisdiction.
Thereafter, the order is violated and the court issues a contempt
order In United States v United Mine Workers27 the Court held
that the trial court has power to punish for contempt while considering its own jurisdiction even though the order is later reversed
on appeal.
In In re Green's Petition28 the court issued an ex parte restraining order and had denied petitioner's request for a hearing on
a motion to vacate the restraining order. The state's authority in
the matter was doubtful. A petitioner, counsel for the respondent,
had advised the restrained union to continue to picket to test the
jurisdiction of the state court. Such a test was made upon agreement with opposing counsel. The petitioner was not allowed to testify at the contempt hearing and was summarily held in contempt.
This order was reversed.
It is often difficult to determine when the spoken word constitutes
contempt of court. So much depends on the circumstances, the
inflection of voice or word emphasis. In Taylor v Gladden29 the
defendant in a criminal case had requested the judge to disqualify
himself. After stating his case, and being overruled on this point,
the defendant persisted, "I think you better disqualify yourself."
The judge replied, "I hold you in contempt of court." The defendant
responded, "I can't express my contempt for you." The contempt
order was upheld by the Oregon Supreme Court. Situations of this
kind call for the drawing of close lines and are further illustrated
by the story of the young lawyer who was making a vain but energetic effort to introduce objectionable evidence. After several
objections were sustained, he appeard to be seething m frustration
and mumbled something barely audible. The judge asked, "Young
man, are you trying to show your contempt for this Court?" The
young lawyer replied, "No, Your Honor, I am trying my best to
conceal it."

27.
28.
29.

330 U.S. 358 (1947).
369 U.S. 689 (1962).
377 P.2d 14 (Ore. 19,62).

